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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




ARTHUR J. KRUMS 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a child custody dispute. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before E. F. Ziegler, Juvenile 
Court Judge. Court held that the child should remain 
in the custody of the mother and that visitation rights 
of the father should be reduced. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks custody of the child by reversal of 
lower Court Order. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of a divorce action which was 
filed in October 1962, in which the mother was the plain-
tiff and the father was the defendant. After a number 
of orders to show cause the Court, John F. Wahlquist, 
awarded temporary custody to the father pending the 
trial. Trial was held on May 8, 1963, and the Court 
granted custody to the mother but provided that the 
father should have the child on week-ends and for six 
weeks in the summer time. Other orders to show cause 
were held at the instance of both parties. The father 
paid $25.00 per month alimony until June 1966, and 
$60.00 per month child support. Their was never any 
question about being current in the payments. The 
Court made a further proviso that the child was not to 
be removed from the jurisdiction without specific per-
mission from the Court. This proviso arose out of testi-
mony at the trial that on an earlier occasion the mother 
had taken the child to Germany and had refused to re-
turn. In June 1966, the mother applied to the Court for 
an order allowing her to take the child to her home in 
Germany. The Court granted permission, and when the 
boy was notified, he ran away from his mother's home 
and walked some two and a half miles to his father's 
home and asked his father to hide him so he would not 
have to go to Germany. Another Order to Show Cause 
was held at which time the child expressed a desire to 
remain with his father and not go to Germany with the 
mother. On July 18, 1966, the child turned ten years 
of age and told the judge he wanted to make his choice. 
The District Court then transferred the matter to the 
Juvenile Court and ordered the child into the protective 
custody of the Welfare Department. 
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The Juvenile Court held two hearings and finally 
ordered the child restored to the custody of the mother 
and restricted the father's rights of visitation with the 
child, keeping the child subject to the protective super-
vision of the Welfare Department. 
From this the father appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO GIVE CONSIDERATION AND WEIGHT TO 
THE CLEAR EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCE OF 
THE CHILD IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION 
AS TO CUSTODY. 
The courts of this state have long recognized the 
doctrine that when a child reaches an age when he is 
capable of making rational and intelligent judgments and 
decisions, his decision and preference as to which of his 
parents he wants to live with, after the parents are sepa-
rated, will be given great weight and consideration in 
the determination of who will maintain custody of the 
child. As stated by the Court in Wallick v. Vance, 76 
Utah 209, 289, Pac 103, 111 0930): 
"In reaching the question as to what will best sub-
serve the interest and happiness of a minor child, 
its own choice may be consulted and given weight 
if it be of an age and capacity to form a rational 
judgment." 
There is ample evidence in this case to indicate the 
high degree of intelligence of the child, as well as his 
ability to recognize the reality of his "life situation" (T. 
2, and p. 7 in the Social File). Coupled with this is the 
fact that there was no finding of fact or conclusion of 
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law that the boy's preference was irrational or incapable 
of the Court's recognition. The boy, being ten years old, 
had a right to have a preference as to his parents, and 
in view of his mental development (T.9), was entitled 
to have his stated preference considered. 
In this case, we have the situation where the cus-
tody of the child could have been placed with either par-
ent, as evidenced by the testimony of Mrs. Dale, Miss 
Bevan and the findings of facts of the Court. (Social File, 
p. 4: "It is difficult to decide which is best [either the 
father or mother] for this boy looking at the situation 
from all sides," and p. 6, 8, 27.) In fact, the evidence 
indicates that neither parents could come close to being 
classed as an unfit or improper person (R. 7, 35, 37, 53). 
With such equality existing as to either parent, the Court 
is forced to look elsewhere for guidance as to its decision. 
What more important and influential factor to look to 
than the stated preference of the child, based on his rec-
ognized ability to recognize what the situation is and to 
make an intelligent judgment as to its resolution? 
Yet, such was not the case. The lower Court dis-
regarded the repeated expressions of choice by the child 
(T. 6, 26, 34, 38, 40, Social File p. 5), and did so not 
only contrary to the present Utah case law, but also 
against the unequivocal expression by the legislature that 
in such cases, the child's preference must be recognized 
( 30-3-5 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
In the recent case of Smith vs. Smith ( 15 Ut. 2d 36, 
386, P. 2d 900 0 963), the children of parents engaged 
in divorce proceedings, indicated that they desired to stay 
with their father. This Court, on appeal, stated on page 
37, that before the preference of the children can be ig-
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nored by the Court, there must be a " ... finding that 
the parents selected be an immoral or unfit person; other-
wise the child must be awarded to the parent chosen." 
It is true that that case involved a custody proceeding 
concurrent with the divorce. That is not the case here, 
for here there exists a time lag between the divorce and 
the custody hearing. But it is submitted that this time 
lag does not bar the same consideration. Appellant does 
not argue that the child of the so-called "tender ages" be 
placed somewhere else than with its fit mother, but once 
the child reaches the age the legislature has deemed suf-
ficient for a child to have a recognizable preference, def-
erence should be given to this preference. 
The legislature has recognized this principle both as 
to divorces and to all other cases of separation, in Utah 
Code Annotated, 30-3-5 and 30-3-10 0953). The per-
tinent language is: 
". . . provided, that if any of such children have 
attained the age of ten years and are of sound mind, 
they shall have the privilege of selecting the parent 
to which they will attach themselves ... " 
This language is the same for both of the above-
quoted sections of the Code. The boy, Arthur, clearly was 
of sound mind and just as clearly, made known his choice 
as to which parent he wished to attach himself. But the 
Court disregarded this clear mandate, and acted contrary 
to the evidence and to the will of the legislature and also 
to the prior decree of the Supreme Court. 
The Smith case, supra, clearly lays down the policy 
that if the child is of the statutory age, and is found to 
be capable of making an intelligent choice, then the 
Court must bow to the statute and the child's preference. 
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As Justice Henriod stated at page 47, if the father is found 
to be a fit and proper person, "this Court has nothing to 
do but apply the statute, which clearly gives the child his 
choice in such case. Otherwise, we would flout the stat-
ute and indulge ourselves the luxury of judicial legisla-
tion." Justice Wade seems to make the awarding of the 
child mandatory by his language on page 37: "This re-
quires a finding that the parent selected be an immoral 
or unfit person; otherwise, the child must be awarded to 
the parent chosen." (Italics added.) In this case the 
father is equally fit with the mother (T. 37 and 35>, is 
capable of keeping a good home for the child (Social File 
p. 2>. The father is not unfit (T. 53, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Social File p. 27). Therefore 
the child should have been awarded to the father. 
If the legislature intended that the Court retain jur-
isdiction to make "such subsequent changes or new or-
ders ... with respect to the disposal of the children ... 
as shall be reasonable and proper," (Utah Code Anno-
tated supra) then the legislature must also have intended 
that any child not yet ten could make an election at age 
ten. No one could say that a child who is nine years 
eight months old should be prohibited forever from mak-
ing an election by the mere fact that at the time the 
Court entered the decree he was four months too young. 
The effect of such a law is to give justice to some but not 
to all. Just as no judge should have" ... the awful power to 
force (one kid) to live with one of the recalcitrants against 
their express wishes, (where the two homebreakers, none-
theless, are found to be equally fit to raise their children 
according to the latter's choice of parents)" supra p. 49, 
so also no child who at age eight wants to go with his 




and with full realization of his life situation chooses his 
fat her should be forced against his wishes to live with his 
mother and even be denied the former rights of visitation. 
The child was even somewhat reluctant to visit with the 
mother while in the foster home (T. 33). 
It is the contention of the appellant that the legisla-
ture fully intended to allow the child, any child, when 
he reached ten years of age to ... "reverse the situation, 
have a choice as to his future, and say that although there 
be a plague on both your houses, I want to live in the one 
in which I want to live" (supra p. 49). 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE FATHER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
ALL OF THE WITNESSES AND ALSO ERRED IN 
DENYING THE RIGHT TO SEE THE MATERIALS 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY THE PSYCHOLO-
GIST. 
In this case the Court specifically found that the 
child was on the verge of a major emotional problem but 
denied the father the right to cross-examine the Psychol-
ogist who had examined the boy <T. 23) and his mother. 
The Court also denied the father and his counsel the 
right to review the materials presented by th Psycholo-
gist <T. 48). This is error. In Caruso vs. Supreme Court, 
2 Arizona App. 134, 406 p. 2 852 <1965), the Arizona 
Court held that the use of materials not presented to 
counsel or to the petitioners should not have been used 
by the Court because counsel and petitioner had no right 
to cross-examine the person who prepared the report. 
Again in Thompson vs. Thompson (55NW2 329) the 
Minn. Court precluded the use of evidence of the Psy-
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chiatrist and others who were not available for cross. 
examination. 
Appellant does not deny the need of the courts to 
such specialized information, nor does he argue that a 
degree of informality should not be present in such pro-
ceedings. What appellant docs contend is that when the 
permanent loss of his son is at issue, procedural safe-
guards to protect the father, the boy and the mother of 
necessity exist. See In Re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 NW 
2 308 0954). As stated by the Court in the Thompson 
case, supra at 332: 
"We believe that the rule should be, when there 
has been no waiver of the right, that an order ... to 
change the custody of children should be based upon a 
hearing in which witnesses may be cross-examined ... 
no one would contend that such parent could be deprived 
the right to cross examine the witnesses upon whose tes-
timony the Court was to base its findings." 
Such is the case at hand due to the equality of the 
respective parent's situations (T. 35, 37). The Psychol-
ogist's reports as to both the mother and the boy gained 
increased importance. That the lower Court recognized ' 
this importance and placed substantial reliance thereon 
is apparent from the record <T. 41, 48, 51-53). In fact 
the Court goes so far as to weigh these reports against ' 
the father's failure to be likewise tested (T. 53). Yet at 
no time did the Court suggest bringing the examiner, Dr. 
Swaner, in for cross examination, nor did he release the ' 
report to appellant. This Court, as long ago as 1907, 
stated in the case of Will vs. Brown 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 
3609, that one of the legal requirements for removing the 
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custody of a child from its parent is that of examining the 
witnesses, including "the right of cross-examination." 
This case is not concerned with the dependency or 
neglect of the child. The issue is solely that of which of 
two natural parents, equally fit, should assume the cus-
tody of the boy. To inject the Psychological Report with 
a favorable recommendation for the mother (Social File 
p. 14) into such a balance, without releasing the same to 
the father or his counsel and without the benefits of exam-
ining the witness was to prejudice the father's case and 
doom his attempt to failure. 
This type of "back door" evidence has been and 
should be banned from this type of hearings. "This 
method of acepting evidence <Psychiatric Report) with 
no opportunity to cross examine was clearly improper ... " 
ln Re Dulay, 265 NYS 2 247, 24 A 2 208 0965>. 
POINT 3. TH COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON 
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF MRS. MARILYN 
DALE AND MISS SHARON BEV AN THAT THE 
CHILD SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE MOTHER. 
The testimony of both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan 
was to the effect that it would make no difference to 
which parent the child would be awarded since both par-
ents were equally fit <Social File p. 4, 5, 6, and 9, T. p. 
4, 5, 37). Yet both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan finally 
made the recommendation that the child should remain 
with the mother. These recommendations arise out of 
visits in the home of the father, when Mrs. Dale stated 
~he was unable to communicate with the father <Social 
File p. 2, T. p. 7), yet Mrs. Dale was able to arrive at 
thl conclusion that the father downgraded the mother, 
cmd said the mother "does not take proper care of the 
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boy emotionally or physically" (which emotional care 
is demonstrated by the fact that the boy has been in the 
care, custody and control of the mother and is now bor-
dering on a complete breakdown <Order p. 6 Social File). 
Both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan, trained in social 
work and relied upon greatly by the Court, ignore the 
obvious fact that the child's emotional problems which 
now present themselves as "bordering on a complete 
breakdown" stem from his constant association with the 
mother. The occasional visit with the father rather is 
branded as the apparent cause of the child's problem. 
This transferrance of female logic is not to be counte-
nanced. Rather than follow her own statement that the 
mother is "very bitter toward Mr. Krums" (Social File 
p. 2) and "the mother is very bitter towards the father, 
and I wonder how she handles this with the boy in terms 
of what his feelings are towards the father" (Social File 
p. 3). Mrs. Dale suggests three courses of action (Social 
File p. 4): (1.) Boy's placement with the father, (2.l 
Boy's placement with the mother, (3.) Boy's placement 
in foster care. Mrs. Dale then says: "It is difficult to 
decide which is best for this boy, looking at the situation 
from all sides." Without explanation she then states her 
feelings. Are we now reduced to accepting the recom-
mendation of a woman who ignores the logic (a) that the 
boy wants to go with his father, (b) the father is able to 
care for him, (c) the father is fit to care for him and (d) 
the boy is now emotionally ill from long association with 
a "very bitter," "depressed" mother? The only conclu-
sion which reasonable men could arrive at would be that 
if the mother makes this boy sick, let the father try to 
help the boy. 
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Miss Bevan suggests that the boy's feelings are 
stronger towards the father, and she then attempts to 
reason why the child would so feel. In her report she 
states that both parents seem to love the child (T. p. 35) 
and yet she says that the child would rather go to the 
father for what he can get from the father. She reports 
that the child seemed to be afraid he would be punished 
if he went to visit his mother and that this was the rea-
son he seemed to want to choose his father rather than 
the mother. This reasoning does not follow. This child 
docs not appear to be so sophisticated as to be able to 
follow Miss Bevan's line of reasoning, or to lead the rea-
soning to the conclusion finally reached. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah law is well established that a child who 
is ten at the time of the granting of the divorce or at the 
time of the separation may make an election and that if 
the: parent selected is fit and proper person the Court is 
bound by the election. <Smith vs. Smith, supra, 30-3-5 
3-3-10 USC 1953). If the law applies to a ten-year-old 
at the time of the divorce or separation then it should 
apply at any time when the question of custody is before 
the Court and the child is of the statutory age. In this 
case the child clearly selected the father on every occa-
sion he was asked. The Court, after stating that there 
was no difference between the parents insofar as fitness 
for the care of the child was concerned, ignored the stated 
preference of the child and ordered the child to go with 
the mother and then warned that if the child disobeyed 
the order of the Court by running away the consequences 
would be dire. The clear implication being that the feel-
ings of the child, the desires of the child, the wishes of 
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the child are of no consequence in the deciding of this 
case, rather the "feelings" of two women, one a Mrs. and 
the other a Miss, are the basis for the Court's decision. 
To allow the obvious intent of the legislature to be sub-
verted to the "feelings" of Court personnel who in their 
reports to the Court relate no difference in the relative 
ability of the parents and who relate again and again that 
the child prefers to go with his father and who arrive at 
a recommendation that the father be cut out of the boy's 
life is to make a mockery of the law. The law is clear and 
well stated that the child should be allowed to choose, 
to ignore the choice when it is made is to echo the state-
ment by Mr. Justice Holmes, " ... the law is a ass"! 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. DEMONT JUDD, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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